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BOOK REVIEWS 
Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive 
Theory of Law 
Alan Hunt 
New York: Routledge, 1993, 381 pp. 
Reviewed by Michael Osbornet 
Alan Hunt's project is "neither autonomous law, nor dependent 
law, but constitutive law." 1 He wants to avoid the naive and incor-
rect assumption of liberalism that law and legal theory are au-
tonomous, and the equally unsatisfying view of law as determined 
by social relations which is held by some Marxists. Such a constitu-
tive theory would account for the interactive relationship between 
law and society: while each influences the other, neither is reducible 
to the other.2 
The book is a collection of previously-published articles. As 
such, it lacks the thematic unity that one would expect were it writ-
ten as one work. What unity it does have derives from the fact that 
Hunt's scholarship has, over the course of the two decades spanned 
by this book, frequently revisited the themes one finds running 
through the collection. Among his concerns are the way that 
Marxists have failed to account for the legitimacy that law has ac-
quired in modern capitalist societies (discussed principally in chap-
ter two, "Law, State, and Class Struggle"); the dichotomy between 
coercion and consent upon which both Marxist and non-Marxist 
thought impales itself (chapter four, "Dichotomy and 
Contradiction in the Sociology of Law"); the deficiencies of the 
politics of law and justice of the left in the face of the growing cen-
trality of law (chapter five, "The Politics of Law and Justice"); the 
"fear of the body snatchers" demonstrated by CLS scholars and the 
problem of the relative autonomy of law (chapter seven, "The 
Theory of Critical Legal Studies"); the assertion by Foucault that 
t B.A. (Saskatchewan), M.A. (Toronto), LLB. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie). 
1 A. Hunt., Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of 
Law (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 182. 
2 Ibid. at 179. 
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law has been ousted as the principal locus of power in society 
(chapter twelve, "Foucault's Expulsion of Law"); and the paradigm 
shift from government to governance, and from law as rules to law 
as regulation (chapter thirteen, "Law as a Constitutive Mode of 
Regulation"). Needless to say, this list does not nearly exhaust the 
ideas canvassed by Hunt, but it does perhaps serve to show the pur-
poseful eclecticism of his work. For these all relate, in one way or 
another, to his central project, which is for law "to be understood 
not in itself, through the introspection of self-referentiality, but 
rather from addressing the connectedness of law, from viewing law 
in its location interacting with and interpenetrating other social pro-
cesses. "3 
One of the principal elements of Hunt's argument is the notion 
that "the fundamental difficulty and problem confronting all legal 
theory lies in the exploration and resolution of the dualism of coer-
cion and consent."4 Law is coercive, yet, in liberal theory, it is based 
on consent. What is more, the law actually obtains the consent of 
those it would coerce. This paradoxical dichotomy is bridged by 
the concept of domination theory. The law operates through 
"repressive domination" as well as "ideological domination."s The 
latter refers to the manner in which law legitimizes the existing 
social order and produces the assent even of those who are 
oppressed by it. The two work together. Thus, "in the pure form of 
the bourgeois democratic state the primary role in the maintenance 
of the social order is fulfilled by the process of ideological domina-
tion and that repressive domination plays a secondary and reinforc-
ing role."6 
Given this constitutive role of law, it is not surprising that Hunt 
sees law as important. This may seem a truism to most, but to a 
socialist or Marxist who holds that law is but a repressive tool in the 
hands of the ruling class, the important fact is not the law itself, but 
who wields it. But in fact, Hunt holds, law has achieved a growing 
centrality in society. Law engages ideological symbols; it encour-
ages some conduct and discourages others; its language- the lan-
guage of "rights,'' "duties,'' "equality," and "justice"- permeates 
political discourse. 
3 Ibid. at 303. 
4 Ibid. at 76. 
s Ibid. at 49. 
6 Ibid. at 52. 
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This principal purpose of the book, as has been noted, is to con-
struct a constitutive theory of law. Certainly the outlines are there, 
but the journey that Hunt proposes to the reader at the beginning 
of the book has not yet found its destination. If there is a terminus, 
it is to be found in the concept of law as a constitutive mode of 
regulation in the final chapter. This conception allows law to be seen 
in terms of its connection with the governance of society, or the 
process of how society is regulated in its broadest sense. The notion 
of law as autonomous must be abandoned, for "[l] egal autonomy is 
grounded in a belief in the severability of law from other related 
social phenomena." 7 And it is precisely Hunt's point that law is 
deeply woven into the fabric of society. 
What flows from Hunt's theory of law is a new conception of 
public law: "the model of law as regulation can be seen as a shift 
toward public law that focuses on the varied means whereby exten-
sive fields of social life are made subject to regulatory inrerven-
tion. "8 And the notion of public law itself will "embrace the regula-
tory activity of territorial states, the enormous regulatory 
productivity of quasistate institutions, professional and institutional 
agencies, and the regulatory activity of economic agencies." 9 This 
gives rise to a rediscovery of legal pluralism: law is not to be 
conceived with a capital "L," as some brooding omnipresence, but 
as something which is present in various forms in society, in both 
public and private institutions (according to the traditional 
conception): 
At the heart of this endeavour is a concern to give full recogni-
tion to the lessons of legal pluralism, that we should recognize 
the diversity of legal phenomena and avoid falling into the pre-
sumption of a unitary entity "the Law," while at the same time to 
give due recognition to the importance of both state as a political 
agency and to state-law. 10 
Thus Hunt has formed what might be termed a legal theory for 
the contemporary state. The experience of most of us is that we are 
governed by a myriad of institutions, of which the government is 
but one. We are, to be sure, subject to income tax laws and the rules 
of the road, but we bump up even more often against the rules of 
7 Ibid. at 304. 
8 Ibid. at 306. 
9 Ibid. at 307. 
10 Ibid. at 307. 
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our workplace or place of study. Our freedom of action is limited 
by legislation, but it is also limited by contracts that we have en-
tered into as by far the weaker party in the bargain. If I read Hunt 
rightly, then what his theory allows is an expansion of the notion of 
law and government to include potentially all of the forms of regu-
lation and governance to which we are subject. 
One of the most enjoyable aspects of Explorations in Law and 
Society is the author's willingness to turn commonly held assump-
tions upside-down. When discussing the propensity of Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) scholars to attack liberalism as being internally 
incoherent, he notes that CLSers also reject the rationalist epistemol-
ogy that demands internal coherence. 11 So they attack the very basis 
of their own critique. But more to the point, Hunt plays with the 
notion that this incoherence may in fact be a strength, and not a 
weakness, of liberalism: incoherence makes room for flexibility and 
discretion, for judicial weighing of values, producing what Hay 
called "the peculiar genius of law."12 
This book is not for the faint of heart. Indeed, behind the clever 
titles hides prose of bewildering complexity. Moreover, much of 
the discussion assumes an easy familiarity with contemporary 
Marxist, critical legal studies, post-modern, and deconstructionist 
legal scholarship. This is understandable, but nonetheless unfortu-
nate, for it makes the work rather difficult to approach. 
Another phenomenon the reader will encounter is that the key 
ideas in the book are constantly being taken up and reformulated. 
Hunt presents not only the central ideas in his theory, but their 
evolution as well. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage: an 
advantage because the notion of law as constitutive of society is seen 
under many different aspects, and a disadvantage because the 
reader remains unsure of the precise formulation of Hunt's doc-
trine. 
All in all, Explorations in Law and Society is a work whose will-
ingness to pursue novel ideas will tantalize, and whose reformula-
tions of the relationship between law and society will enlighten. 
11 Ibid. at 169. 
12 Ibid. at 173. 
